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The aim of this article is to illustrate the types of practical legal issues that arise during coalition operations and how they may be managed. These issues are 
drawn from my experience in relation to operations involving UK forces during 
the period from October 2002 to February 2005 and, in particular, to the period of 
combat operations that fo llowed the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Given that 
they relate in part to operations that are continuing today, my abili ty to disclose de-
tail is strictly limited, but I will endeavor to provide practical examples to illustrate 
points where I can. 
The Role of the Operational Lawyer 
Among the essential functions of every coalition commander is the requirement, 
in the planning and execution of a mission, to identify and manage the differing 
military capabilities across his fo rce. It follows. therefore. that insofar as they might 
impact on the scope of the military missions. the role of his operational lawyer in 
the planning and conduct of the mission is to identify, minimize and manage the 
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different national legal positions and to ensure that his commander is fully sighted 
on them. This requires a deep knowledge not only of "his own" national legal posi-
tion, but also of those of each coalition partner, drawing on whether each has ratified 
treaties and conventions (and, if so, with what reservations and understandings), 
as well as an understanding of each State's practice, opinio juris and academic 
writings. 
With the increasingly frequent deployment of forces to multinational peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement missions throughout the 1990s, legal differences 
between even the closest coalition partners, which had remained largely below the 
radar during decades dominated by Cold War planning, became increasingly visi-
ble. By the end of that decade, many lessons had been identified and were the sub-
ject of the closest examination from the general, such as our respective positions on 
the use of lethal force in the defense of property, to the specific, such as "What could 
we have done under our own laws if faced with a 'Srebrenica'?"] 
The invasion and occupation of Iraq by coalition forces in 2003 threw up a great 
many "coalition issues" but I will focus on three: first, those arising from targeting; 
second, those in relation to rules of engagement (ROE); and third, those arising 
from the capture ofinternees, detainees and prisoners of war. I will return to the 
main subjects shortly, but, using a well-known example, let me start by illustrating 
the sort of complex coalition issues that may arise. 
Anti-personnel Landmines 
An oft-cited example of coalition differences is the Ottawa Convention on land-
mines.2 Put simply, signatories to this Convention may not use anti-personnel 
landmines in the "victim-initiated mode," that is, when they may be exploded by 
the presence, proximity or contact ofa person. It does not, however, prevent either 
the use of other types oflandmines, or indeed the use of anti-personnellandmines 
other than in the "victim-initiated mode." 
While this presents the land component commander of a coalition force com-
prised of both "Ottawa" and "non-Ottawa" States with a tactical complication, the 
legal issues extend beyond the "mere" tactical. If a commander, as a result of t reaty 
obligations placed upon him by "Ottawa," cannot authorize the use of air-dropped 
anti-personnellandmines to deny an enemy access to a particular facility, he may 
be faced with the expectation of a higher nwnber of civilian casualties as a result of 
a kinetic strike. If expected civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the direct 
and concrete military advantage anticipated, no attack may be possible. Even ifnot 
excessive, they may, of course, be greater than those expected if landmines were 
used instead. There may, therefore, be a tension between treaty obligations. Indeed, 
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given that prohibitions under "Ottawa" extend to those who wouJd "use, develop, 
produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indi-
rectly") or who wouJd "assist, encourage, induce anyone else to engage in prohib-
ited activity"4 differing national positions within a coalition might have wider 
repercussions and complicate the provision of basing and the management of 
complex air-tasking order cycles during high-intensity warfighting. 
Legal Framework for the Conduct of Operations in Iraq from March to May 2003 
Whatever the precise legal bases adopted by coalition partners for the conduct of 
operations, and there were subtle differences among the coalition positions, the 
most important legal question at the operational and tactical levels was of the legal 
framework to regulate the conduct of the operation. What was clear by early 2003 
was that any invasion would precipitate an armed conflict in which the operative 
law wouJd be the law of armed conflict. 
Targeting 
The GuJfWar of 1991 generated much legal debate over the extent to which Addi-
tional Protocol I (AP 1)5 was said to codify the customary international law on the 
use offorce in armed conflict. This may have been in part because at the time, while 
most of the members of the coalition against Iraq had ratified AP I, the United 
Kingdom and Australia had signed but not ratified, and the United States had 
signed but in 1987 announced that it did not intend to become a party. This, and 
the fact that Iraq had not even signed it, meant that AP I was therefore not applica-
ble to those hostilities. Between 1991 and 2003 there had been only modest change 
to the overall position in that the United Kingdom (like Australia) had ratified AP I, 
whereas the United States and Iraq had not. Nevertheless, in 2003 as a matter of 
practice it is arguable that the definition of a military objective and the principles of 
distinction and proportionality, even the use of precautions in attack, as they are 
set out in AP 1,6 were generally applied by all coalition forces. Put simply, if asked 
whether as a matter of practice AP I differences were significant in the early part of 
2003, I would have to say that on the whole they were not. 
Among the reasons for this, a number are simply practical. The relatively 
straightforward application of customary international law as refl ected in AP 1 
during the high-intensitywarfighting operations in the ftrst half of2003 was due in 
part to the scale and character of the operation. Despite its formidable military 
power, the 2003 invasion force was about half the size of that which had evicted 
Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. This relatively small force embarked upon a high-speed 
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land offensive on a single axis aimed at Baghdad. This had three consequences that, 
taken together, had a significant legal effect. First, by the time of the invasion the 
warfighting mission was--effectively-an agreed one. Second, the scale and char-
acter of the land maneuver had required the governments of coalition forces to del-
egate the authority to conduct attacks to their commanders in theater. And third, 
in those first six weeks or so of operations, coalition forces conducted what was,le-
gally speaking, a most conventional international armed conflict. 
The proportionality test-as it applies in targeting, and in particular to the cen-
ter of gravity, which is a determination of the military advantage-is ideally suited 
to use by military commanders in support of their forces engaged in a conven-
tionalland campaign. That is not to say that there will not be differences, but most 
differences are, in my experience, successfully resolved by staff officers in theater 
who have an understanding of, and respect for, each others' national positions. 
This was greatly assisted in 2003 by the presence in deployed headquarters of UK 
and US officers who were able to draw upon shared experience and mutual confi-
dence that had grown out of operations conducted together since 9/1 1 in relation 
to Afghanistan. Finally, and perhaps ironically in light of events which have en-
sued, it must be accepted that the initial combat operations were successful; so 
successful that commanders were able to apply a cautious approach without any 
obvious military penalty, and could have decided not to authorize attacks which, 
while capable of being conducted lawfully, might have had an adverse information 
operations impact. 
I have until now focused on the issues as they relate to what might be called "de-
liberate targeting." This is where the most senior military commanders in theater, 
supported by technologically sophisticated targeting systems and specialist staffs, 
including (among others) targeteers, intelligence officers, image analysts, opera-
tional analysts and, of course, legal advisers, make command decisions on the le-
gality of airstr ikes as part of a huge and sophisticated command process. Such 
processes are quite capable of delivering kinetic attacks by hundreds of aircraft 
throughout a campaign. While that process is incredibly accurate and-for its size 
and complexity-agile, not all air attacks can be subject to the deliberate targeting 
process however expedited. While the law places the heaviest burden on senior 
commanders to take the greatest steps to avoid or minimize the effects of an attack 
on civilians to the extent that it is feasible for them to do so, the reality is that the 
obligations upon all who plan, authorize and conduct attacks are derived from the 
same law. Therefore, it is perhaps a dangerous oversimplification to suggest that, 
except where attacks are approved as a part of a deliberate targeting process, the use 
of force is solely a matter for ROE. 
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In order to provide support to land forces engaging the enemy in a dtyor built-
up area, the availabilityofimmediate kinetic support to be applied with the highest 
possible accuracy is necessary. In 2003, in response to an "urgent operational re-
quirement," coalition partners acting independently produced strikingly similar 
direction and guidance that identified the same legal obligations, identified the re-
spective legal responsibilities of those requiring close air support and those directly 
involved in providing it, and sought to ensure that within what was a tactical-level 
targeting process all involved were quite dear as to "who owned the bomb" so that 
legal obligations were discharged. Coalition forces were effectively interoperable in 
this respect. 
Rules of Engagement 
Having set out some of the successful features of recent coalition operations and 
demonstrated their interoperability, I now have to make an admission-in 2003 
the coalition partners at all times operated on their own separate targeting direc-
tives and their own separate rules of engagement. It is with this in mind that I have 
been asked to consider the problems that flow from not having coalition ROE. 
Having trained as an operational lawyer in the years that followed Kosovo, I was 
keenly aware of the perception that coalition operations are necessarily fraught 
with difficulties or, in the view of some, that they may be more trouble than they 
are worth. The difficulties of Kosovo and other coalition operations in the 1990s 
have clearly had a lasting impact in military legal circles on both sides of the Atlan-
tic and may even be behind the specific question which I have been asked to 
address. 
There is no doubt that in each of our respective nations ROE can mean different 
things. They can be placed in different parts of mission directives or operational or-
ders. They can be presented in the form of guidance or orders. They can use differ-
ent language and style. However, as I have sought to suggest here, if the legal basis 
for the mission and the legal framework for the use of force used by coalition part-
ners are sufficiently coherent, then the use of different ROE doctrine, formatting, 
style and process is entirely manageable. The key question about national ROE in 
the coalition context is "What exactly do they mean?" 
Too often, operators, and even occasionally military lawyers, have been tempted 
to label differences in national law or policy as "ROE problems." Such debate does 
not begin to identify the problem, only the symptom. If different ROE are rules or 
guidance (that distinction is not important here) that reflect a common legal au-
thority to conduct a mission then their effects will be largely the same. 
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For more than a decade after the passing of the UN Security Council resolution7 
to enforce the sanctions imposed after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait maritime com-
manders enjoyed the use of a mandate that was perhaps unprecedented in its sim-
plicity and robustness, and became accustomed to stopping vessels-indeed "all 
inward and outward maritime shipping" -in order to ensure strict implementa-
tion of the embargo imposed by Security Council Resolution 661.6 Once estab-
lished that a vessel was proceeding to or from Iraq (not too arduous a task given the 
geography ofthe northern Arabian Gull) there was no requirement to have either 
the "suspicion" or "reasonable grounds" as to its precise activity before boarding 
that are common requirements in peace and (in relation to neutral vessels) in 
armed conflict. 
Post-9/11 maritime operations were not legally so straightforward. Indeed, in 
the context of mari time security operations, the vexing issue of masters' consen-
sual boardings illustrates the altogether different legal picture that exists. Among 
coalition partners, some (including the United Kingdom) do not believe that the 
master has the authority to permit boardings by fore ign authorities under either 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea9 or the customary law 
of the sea. Others disagree and take the position that with the voluntary permission 
of the master not only may the vessel be boarded, but the ship's papers and cargo 
may be inspected. to While this and other national legal positions may be reduced 
by operators to a matrix of coalition ROE and a " traffic light" encapsulation of 
what certain States can and cannot do, this is not a ROE issue. Instead, it is the seri-
ous business of sovereign States having different views on the status of in terna-
tional law; views to which they a re entitled and views which will not be remedied by 
simple request to the chain of command to modify the ROE. 
The conundrum for military lawyers is to ensure that the status of ROE, and in 
particular the relationship between ROE and the law, is absolutely clear. This task is 
difficul t enough within national armed forces, but within a coalition it is quite pos-
sible that national positions could range from " if the ROE permit me to act my ac-
tions are lawful" to " the ROE permit me to act within the law." The implications of 
such different approaches are plain-if we are unable to identify the link between 
ROE and legal authority for them the cohesion of the coalition is at risk. 
There has been a crucial debate in academic and mili tary legal circles in recent 
years on the issue of "direct participation in hostili ties." What does it mean, how-
ever, when ROE permit a relatively junior commander to declare unidentified at-
tackers "hostile"? Does it mean that a test for the "direct participation" has been 
met or is he simply determining that they are a threat against which lethal force 
may be used in self-defense? If it is the former, the conduct of any attack will be reg-
ulated by the law of anned conflict and the operative proportionality rule will likely 
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be much more permissive than that available under any national laws. If it is the 
former, in an armed conflict, those captured will have the right to be treated as pris-
oners of war. These are the legal implications which can flow from the application 
of ROE at the individual unit level. 
A coalition commander must be vested (by his operational lawyer) with a com-
pete understanding of what coalition forces can and cannot do, and why. He must 
know whether he can expect disparities to be remedied by a ROE request for addi-
tional authority to act, or whether a States' forces are already at the limits of their 
national legal positions. Coalition commanders must appreciate whether those na-
tional positions are policy positions (which may change) or legal positions (which 
may be less likely to change). Will a common ROE remedy these perceived prob-
lems? My short answer to this is no, but I can quite see how the use of common lan-
guage and form might greatly assist the process of identifying, minimizing and 
managing different national positions. 
Prisoners of War, Detainees and Internees 
Given the almost immediate and widespread legal controversy that surrounded the 
establishment of the detention facility at the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, the conclusion by the three main coalition partners in March 2003 of a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the handling and transfer of prisoners 
of war, internees and detainees in Iraq was a clear indication of the anticipated 
"conventional" international armed conflict which was to commence with the in-
vasion. The power to capture enemy combatants in Iraq was derived from belliger-
ent powers under the law of armed conflict and the conditions for their treatment 
were, the partners agreed, set out in the Third Geneva Convention. 11 The resultant 
MOU was, in great part, similar to that agreed by their predecessors in 1991 and 
provided, in particular, for the transfer of prisoners between coalition partners. 
And so if asked whether there were, during combat operations in 2003, signifi-
cant coalition problems in relation to the handling of prisoners of war, internees 
and detainees in Iraq as a result of any different interpretation of the law of armed 
conflict I would have to say no. Even when the actions of a large proportion of the 
Iraqi military who abandoned their units and uniforms at an early stage in the war 
threw up unexpected challenges, the handling of issues was generally successful. 
This included, for example, the instigation of a novel initial screening system in-
volvingjoint teams of UK and US military legal and operational officers to process 
large numbers of prisoners where the delay to conduct Article 5 tribunalsl2 in every 
case was unnecessary. 
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Whereas the issues relating to prisoner of war camps were relatively straightfor-
ward, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have presented complex coali-
tion legal challenges. Under Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
occupying powers may intern inhabitants of the occupied territory "for imperat ive 
reasons of security."i3 This power has been broad1y preserved in the UN Security 
Council resolutions that have authorized the ongoing presence of multinational 
forces in Iraq since 2004. 14 Indeed, using this power the United Kingdom has held 
an average of around 120 internees in the Multi-National Division South East area 
of responsibility, including one (Mr. Al leddah, a UK citizen captured in Iraq) 
since 2004. The United Kingdom's ability to intern has been the subject of legal 
challenge in our domestic courts. 
Many will be familiar with the position of the United Kingdom in relation to the 
death penalty, but cases in the UK domestic courts arising out of incidents in Iraq 
have now established that those captured and held by UK forces on operations out-
side armed conflict have rights under the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR). IS These include not only the right not to be tortured but also a right to lib-
erty. On this basis, the right to intern was challenged and successfully defended. A 
feature of UK operations since 2003 therefore has been the legal examination of the 
relationship between international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law, particularly in relation to when detainees and internees may be handed 
over and to whom. The United Kingdom cannot transfer internees to States who 
cannot guarantee that their essential human rights will be upheld. This places de-
mands upon coalition commanders to understand, through their operational legal 
advisers, the respective legal responsibilities which apply to all those under their 
operational command. Can we guarantee that if internees are transferred to a co-
alition partner they will be released when their internment is no longer necessary 
for imperative reasons of security in Iraq or may they still be held while they are of 
actual or even potential intelligence value? Concerns about torture and mistreat-
ment may get the head1ines, but given the right to liberty present in the ECHR and 
other similar regimes, the fIrst-order issue for coalition commanders may be to 
identify exactly what legal authority coalition partners and host nations believe 
they have to detain and when they consider they are obliged to release. 
Private Military Contractors 
Although much progress has been made in recent years in addressing the issues dis-
cussed above, there is an elephant in the room that will, I believe, require our care-
ful attention, even in the maritime environment. If they have not done so already, 
coalition planners may in the fu ture have to consider not only international 
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military forces and interagency forces and international interagency forces, but 
also the private military contractors who seem determined to expand into roles 
which may previously have been considered the preserve of the military. 
Concluding Comments 
I believe that coalition operations can work, and can work well. I witnessed a US-
instigated coalition ROE response to a successful suicide vessel-borne improvised 
explosive device attack on a boarding party in the northern Arabian Gulf that took 
hours, not days or weeks, to plan and implement. This was possible because the op-
erational legal advisers to the maritime commanders in the region as a matter of 
course had continually identified, minimized and managed their respective coali-
tion positions. There will continue to be difficulties, but perhaps militaries and 
military lawyers have begun to understand better how to deal with them. If they 
have, all military commanders may begin to view the law as it applies across coali-
tions less as a constraint and more as an enabler. 
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